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by ALBERT E. BURGER and CHARLOTTE E. RUEBLING
ONETARY ACTIONS TN 1969 exerted a de-
cidedly more restrictive effect on the future course of
economic activity than in the previous two years. All
of the major economic variables generally used as in-
dicators of monetary ease or restraint evidenced the
restrictive influence. Tn 1969 the growth rates of the
money stock, defined as currency and demand de-
posits held by the nonbank public, and money more
broadly defined to include time deposits, decreased
markedly from the previous two years. Bank credit
likewise showed a slower rate of increase. Interest
rates rose rapidly during most of the year, reaching
levels well above their averages in previous years.
This article discusses the decisions of the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) in 1969 and the
implementation of these policy decisions, It analyzes
the contribution of FOMC policy actions to the reduc-
lion in the expansionary effect of monetary influences
on the future growth of real economic activity and
prices.
The FOMC is composed of the seven members of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem and five of the twelve district Federal Reserve
Bank presidents. The other seven presidents attend
meetings and participate in the deliberations but do
not vote. Except for the president of the New York
Federal Reserve Bank \vho is a permanent member,
membership rotates among the presidents each March,
At the first t~vo meetings of 1969, the presidents on the
FOMC, in addition to Mr. Hayes (New York), were:
Mr. Kimbrel (Atlanta), Mr. Morris (Boston), Mr.
Hickman (Cleveland), and Mr. Galusha (Minneap-
olis). Beginning March 4, the rotating members were:
Mr. Scanlon (Chicago), Mr. Coldwell (Dallas), Mr.
Clay (Kansas City), and Mr. Bopp (Philadelphia).
The FOMC met fourteen times in 1969 to review
and evaluate developments in the economy and, in
light of these prevailing circumstances, to prescribe
what objectives open market operations should try to
achieve until the next meeting in order to further the
longer-run goals of monetary policy. The matters
discussed included: changes in spending, production,
and prices; international developments; Treasury
financing and the Federal budget; interest rates and
other measures of mnoney market conditions; and
monetary aggregates. A summary of these discussions
including the text of the policy directive issued to
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York — the Bank
selected by the Committee to execute transactions for
the System Open Market Account — is released to the
public about 90 days after each meeting, and pub-
lished in the Federal Reserve Bulletin and each spring
in the Annual Report of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System. The records of the meet-
ings include the voting position of members and any
dissenting comments.
FOMC Directives
After the majority of the membership of the FOMC
has decided upon the desired influence of monetary
policy on ultimate targets (objectives of policy) such
as employment and prices, the Committee issues a
policy directive to the New York Federal Reserve
Bank. The Trading Desk at the New York Bank carries
out day-to-day open market transactions for the
System. Hereafter, for sake of brevity, this article will
refer to the directive as being issued to the “Desk.”
It might appear that writing the directive would
be a simple procedure. However, in actual operation
S
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this has not been the case. The influence of FOMC
policy actions on the ultimate targets of monetary
policy is modified by many other economic factors.
Therefore, the FOMC attempts to control one or
more economic variables intermediate in the lin~cage
between its purchase and sale of securities and real
income, employment, and prices. Such intermediate
variables may then he used to help indicate
whether the total influence of the financial sector
on future economic activity is becoming more or
less expansionary.
There has been a lack of general agreement among
the members of the FOMC as to which economic
variable or variables best summarize the total influ-
ence of the financial sector on real economic activity.
Some members believe that market interest rates are
the best indicator, Others consider bank credit of
major significance. A third viewpoint is that the
money stock is the best indicator. Probably the pre-
dominate view is that all of these indicators and many
other factors with changing weights should be con-
sidered.
During 1969 the directive to the Desk was worded
in terms of “money and short-term credit market
conditions.” The majority of the FOMC deemed that
these variables represented the best operational mech-
anism for implementing open market policy. For
example, referring to Exhibit I, the operating instruc-
tions to the Desk in 1969 were repeatedly:
System open market operations until the next meet-
ing of the Committee shall be conducted with a
view to maintaining the prevailing firm conditions
in money and short-term credit markets,
Since May 10, 1966 the directive has also contained
a “proviso clause” which instructs the Desk to alter
its operations if a significant deviation in the economic
variable stated in this clause is observed. In 1969 the
proviso clause was stated in terms of bank credit.1
tm
In recent years the Committee has been making use of
daily-average statistics on total member bank deposits as a
“bank credit proxy” — that is, as the best available measure,
although indirect, of developing movements in bank credit,
Because they can be compiled on a daily basis with a very
short lag, the deposit figures are more nearly current than
available bank loan and investment data. Moreover, average
deposit figures for a calendar month are much less subject
to the injluence of single-date fluctuations than are the avail-
able month-end data on total bank credit, which represent
estimates of loans and investments at all commercial banks
on one day — the last Wednesday — of each month.
Movements in total member bank deposits and in com-
mercial hank credit can diverge for various reasons, includ-
ing changes in nondeposit liabilities of banks. Because
changes in U.S. bank liabilities to foreign branches recently
have been an important source of divergence from time to
time, an “adjusted” proxy series, taking approximate account
of such changes, is now also being calculated for Committee
use.
The Desk must consider not only the policy direc-
tive, but also all the discussion at the preceding
FOMC meeting, staff projections of financial and
other economic conditions, and day-to-day develop-
ments in the financial markets. Each morning, before
executing operations for the day, the Desk calls the
Board of Governors and one district hank president
who is a voting member of the FOMC. During this
“morning call,” if they believe the operations of the
Desk are not in line with the intent expressed by the
FOMC at the last meeting, the Board members or
bank president may suggest changes in open market
operations. However, the Desk’s responsibility is to
the whole Committee, not to any individual member;
hence it is not required to follow the advice given on
these “morning calls.”
The Desk, for the most part, has interpreted the
operating instructions contained in the directive in
terms of short-term money market conditions. This
has generally meant conducting open market opera-
tions between meetings of the FOMC to control the
Federal funds rate and the level of member bank
free reserves or net borrowed reserves,2 and short-
tenn interest rates such as the Treasury bifi rate. A
rise in the Federal funds rate or a decrease in the level
of member bank free reserves indicates open market
operations have exerted a tighter influence or allowed
a “firming in money market conditions.” If, between
FOMC meetings, the Federal Funds rate and free
reserves average approximately the same as over the
period prior to the last meeting, this is taken as an
indication that the Desk has operated so as to “main-
tain existing money market conditions.”
FOMC Decisions in 1969
The major policy goal of the FOMC in 1969 was
to conduct open market operations in a manner that
would reduce the rate of expansion of total spending
and hence ultimately result in a slowing in the rate
of increase of prices. The stated policy goals in the
directive remained essentially the same at each
meeting:
to foster financial conditions conducive to the
reduction of inflationary pressures, with a view to
encouraging a more sustainable rate of economic
growth and attaining reasonable equilibrium in the
country’s balance of payments.
Inflation was the primary concern of the Committee,
but at the same time they wanted to avoid a degree
tm
Member bank free resen’es are equal to excess reserves of
member banks less member bank borrowings from the Fed-
eral Reserve. If borrowings exceed excess reserves, as in 1969,
then this figure is negative, and is referred to as net bor-
rowed reserves.
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In this situation, it is the polity of the
Federal Open Market Committee to foster
financial conditions conducive to the reduction
of inflationary pressures with a view to en-
couraging a more sustainable rate of economic
growth and attaining reasonable equilibrium in
the country’s balance of payments.
Dissents;
Operating Instructions
To implement this policy. System open market opera-
tions until the next meeting of the Committee shall be
conducted with a view to maintaining the prevailing firm
conditions in money and short-term credit markets;
Proviso Clause of Directive
provided, however, that operations shall be modified,
to the extent permitted by the forthcoming Treasury
refunding, if bank credit expansion appears to be
deviating significantly from current prolections.
February 4 No change . ..while taking account of the current Treasury refunding, provided, however, that operations shall be modified,
Dissents: System open market operations until the next meeting of to the extent permitted by the Treasury refunding, if
None the Committee shall be conducted with a view to maintain-
ing the prevailing firm conditions in money and short-term
credit markets;
bank credit appears to be deviating significantly from
current projections.
March 4 No change ... System open market operations until the next meeting provided, however, that operations shall be modified
Dissents: of the Committee shall be conducted with a view to main- if bank credit appears to be deviating significantly
None taming on balance about the prevailing firm conditions in
money and short-term credit markets;
from current projections.
April 1 No change .. .System open market operations until the next meeting provided, however, that operations shall be modified
Dissents, of the Committee shall be conducted with a view to main- if bank credit appears to be deviating significantly
Mr. Coldwell taming firm conditions in money and short-term credit from current prolections.
Mr. Maisel markets, taking account of the effects of other possible
monetary policy action;
April 29 No change .. .while taking account of the forthcoming Treasury provided, however, thot operations shalt be modified
Dissents: refunding, System open market operations until the next if bank credit appears to be deviating significantly
None meeting of the Committee shall be conducted with a view
to maintaining the prevailing firm conditions in money
and short-term credit markets.
from current projections.
May 27 No change .. .System open market operations until the next meeting provided, however, that operations shall be modified
Dissents, of the Committee shall be conducted with a view to main- if bank credit appears to be deviating significantly from






Mr. MorrisJune 24 No change
Dissents,
• System open market operations until the next meeting
of the Committee shall be conducted with a view to main-
taining the firm conditions currently prevailing in short-
term credit markets
provided, however, that operations shall be modified
if bank credit appears to be deviating significantly
from current projectians ar if unusual liquidity pressures
should develop.
December 16 No change
Dissents,
None
•. System open market operations until the next meeting
of the Committee shall be conducted with a view to main
taming the prevailing firm conditions in the money market;
provided, however, that operations shall be modified
if bank credit appears to be deviating significantly
from current projections or if unusual liquidity pressures
should develop.
Mr. Maisel
July 15 No change while taking account of the forthcoming Treasury provided, however, that operations shall be modified,
Dissents: refunding, System open market operations shall be can- to the extent permitted by the Treasury refunding, if
None ducted with a view to maintaining the currently prevailing
firm conditions in money and short-term credit markets;
bank credit appears to be deviating significantly from
current projections.
August 12 The wording of the policy consensus was ..System open market operations until the next meeting provided, however, that operations shall be modified
changed to read .- with a view to encourag- of the Committee shall be conducted with a view to main- if bank credit appears to be deviating significantly
ing sustainable economic growth, instead of - .- taming the prevailing firm conditions in money and short- from current projections or if pressures arise in connec-
more sustainable economic growth. The word term credit markets; tian with foreign exchonge developments or with bank
‘more’ was dropped to avoid the implication regulatory changes.
that reduced rates of growth of real GNP might




September 9N o change .,,while taking account of the forthcoming Treasury re- provided, however, that operations shall be modified
Dissents: funding, System open market operations until the next to the extent permitted by the Treasury refunding, if
Mr. Moisel meeting of the Committee shall be conducted with a view bank credit appears to be devioting significantly from
Mr. Mitchell to maintaining the prevailing firm conditions in money and
short.term credit markets;
~
current projection or if pressures arise in connection
with foreign exchange developments or with bank
regulatory changes.
October 7N o change .. .System open market operations until the next meeting provided, however, that operations shall be modified
Dissents: of the Committee shall be conducted with a view to main- if bank credit appears to be deviating significantly from
Mr. Maisel taming the prevailing firm conditions in money ond short-
term credit markets;
current projections.
October 28 No change .. -System open market operations until the next meeting provided, however, that operations shall be modified
Dissents, of the Committee shall be conducted with a view to main- if bank credit appears to be deviating significantly
None taming the prevailing firm conditions in money and short-
term credit markets;
- - - System open market operations until the next meeting
from current projections.
provided, however, that operations shall be modified if November 25 No change
Dissents: of the Committee shall be conducted with a view to main- bank credit appears to be deviating significantly from
None taming the prevailing firm conditions in money and short-
term credit markets;
current projections or if pressures arise in connection
with possible bank regulatory changes.
C,
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of restriction that would precipitate a serious down-
turn in economic activity.
The decision to “tighten” monetary policy had come
at the December 17, 1968 meeting of the FOMC. By
that time it was apparent that such a move was nec-
essary to reduce inflationary pressures. The available
evidence convinced many members of the FOMC
that the fiscal restraint embodied in the 10 per cent
snrtax and planned expenditure cuts could not suffi-
ciently quell total demand in the face of the strong
demand pressures in the economy.
Therefore, the FOMC instructed the Desk that
“open market operations be conducted with a view
to attaining firmer conditions in money and short-term
credit markets, taking account of the effects of other
possible monetary action.” The “other monetary ac-
tion” referred to an increase in the Federal Reserve
discount rate from 5¼ to
5
1/i per cent announced on
December 17 and effective the day following the
FOMC meeting. Previously, during the second half
of 1968, the instruction had been simply to “maintain
about the prevailing conditions” or to accommodate
somewhat less firm conditions.5
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Although the operating instructions in terms of
money market conditions contained in the directive
remained almost unchanged throughout 1969, the
year may be divided into two periods using other
measures of the degree of restraint such as the
growth rate of the monetary base or bank reserves.
3
See Jerry L. Jordan and Charlotte E. Ruebling, “Federal Open
Market Committee Decisions in 1968 — A Year of Watchful
Waiting,” this Review (May 1969), pp. 6-15.
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January Through June — Move to Restraint
This period encompasses seven FOMC meetings.
Referring to Exhibit I, the wording of the primary
instructions in the second paragraph of the directive
remained almost unchanged. The policy directive is-
sued to the Desk was to:
-.maintain the pt-evailing firm conditions in money
and short-term credit markets.
According to the proviso clause, open market opera-
tions were to be altered only if:
bank credit appears to be deviating significantly
from current projections.
During the first half of 1969 the continuing con-
sensus of the FOMC appears to have been that
“persistence of upward pressures on prices and wide-
spread inflationary expectations” made it desirable
to maintain monetary restraint. At the January 14
meeting, economic activity was projected to show a
further slowing in the first half of 1969. Consumer
spending was expected to continue to grow at a
moderate rate, with higher social security taxes and
retroactive payments on 1968 income taxes exercising
a dampening influence. On the other hand, industrial
production and payroll employment were continuing
to rise rapidly in December 1968, and the unemploy-
inent rate was at a 3.3 per cent level in November
and December. Further rapid increases in prices were
expected.
At the February 4 and March 4 FOMC meetings
the analysis of economic conditions was basically the
same as at the mid-January meeting. Slower growth
in real output and some easing in inflationary pres-
sures were projected for the second half of 1969. The
members of the FOMC noted the continued down-
ward trend in outstanding large-denomination certifi-
cates of deposit and the moderation in the expansion
of demand deposits. At the same time some concern
was expressed over the growth of business loans and
the growing use of nondeposit sources of funds by
banks.4 The upward pressures on prices remained
the primary concern of the Committee. The majority
decision was for no change in the existing degree of
monetary restraint.
~This concern was partly evidenced by the use of an adjusted
bank credit proxy — daily averages of member bank deposits,
adjusted to include changes in the daily average of U.S.
bank liabilities to foreign branches.
These variables indicate a move to
period from January through June
restraint frotn mid-year to the end of
restraint in the
and increased
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Some members urged caution in applying monetary
restraint at the first three meetings of the year. At
the January meeting Mr. Morris dissented on the
grounds that the directive could be consistent with
an unduly restrictive monetary policy. Comments at
the following meetings on the proviso clause indicated
the delicate balance under which open market opera-
tions were to be conducted. The Committee agreed
that the proviso clause should be invoked in the di-
rection of firming only if bank credit appeared to be
growing at more than a moderate rate. They also cau-
tioned that the proviso clause should not be allowed
to give the impression that the basic stance of mone-
tary policy had been relaxed.
Projections of GNP for the April 1 FOMC meeting
were revised upward. Expansion of real GNP in the
first quarter appeared to have moderated less than
was projected earlier. The upward revision in the
projection of future economic activity was based to a
large extent on a Department of Commerce— SEC
survey taken in early February. This survey indicated
that business planned a 14 per cent increase in new
plant and equipment spending in 1969 compared to
1968. Also, retail sales data indicated that consumer
spending had not moderated to the extent projected
earlier. Nonfarm employment had continued to ex-
pand in February, unemployment remained at a 3,3
per cent level, and average hourly earnings of pro-
duction workers continued to rise.
The consensus of the FOMC at the April 1 meet-
ing was that “some further monetary policy action
was called for at this time in the light of the greater-
than-expected pace of the economic expansion and
the continuation of pervasive inflationary pressures
and expectations.” Prior to the meeting, the boards
of directors of eight Reserve Banks had approved in-
creases in the discount rate, and submitted these
increases to the Board of Governors for approval. At
this meeting discussion was also directed to the ques-
tion of the desirability of an increase in member bank
reserve requirements. Generally, the members of the
Committee agreed on the desirability of an increase
in the discount rate. However, there was some differ-
ence of opinion on the desirability of raising reserve
requirements.
There were two dissents from the majority view
at the early April meeting. Mr. Coldwell, president
of the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank, expressed the
view that greater monetary restraint was called for in
the light of current conditions. Governor Maisel dis-
sented from the majority opinion for the opposite
reason. Governor Maisel’s opinion was summarized
as follows:
insofar as the Committee’s action reflected a
desire to affect the prevailing inflationary psychology
directly, it represented a shift from the Committee’s
proper concern with flows of credit and money to
an improper target not readily susceptible to such
influence. He particularly objected to the directive
as adopted because he thought that operations un-
der it were likely to depress flows of the monetary
aggregates to rates below those that seemed to him
to be desirable and maintainable for a considerable
period, and that such operations would thus be in-
consistent with the gradualist approach to the ulti-
mate objective of price stability that he favored.
Two days later the Board of Governors announced
an increase in the discount rate by district Reserve
Banks and raised the reserve requirements on mem-
ber bank demand deposits. By April 8, all Reserve
Banks had raised their discount rate from 5½per
cent to 6 per cent. Effective April 17, member bank
reserve requirements on net demand deposits were
raised by one-half of one percentage point.
At the FOMC meeting held in late April, the
members of the Committee were presented with pre-
liminary estimates which indicated real GNP had ex-
panded in the first quarter at only a slightly reduced
rate. Staff projections for the second quarter sug-
gested that GNP would grow at approximately the
same rate as in the first quarter. A further slowing
in real GNP in the second half of the year was pro-
jected based on the lagged effects of monetary re-
straint and a continued restrictive fiscal policy. How-
ever, projections for the second half of the year still
pointed to continued upward pressures on prices.
At this meeting, although some members questioned
whether greater monetary restraint should not be
exercised, the consensus was against a further move
to more restraint. The majority view was based on
the expected lagged effects of the previous mone-
tary restraint on economic activity later in the year
and the forthcoming Treasury financing. The FOMC
decided that open market operations should be di-
rected to “maintaining the finner conditions in money
and short-tenn credit markets that had been
achieved.” The proviso clause directed the Desk to
alter operations, insofar as Treasury financing per-
mitted, if bank credit appeared to be deviating sig-
nificantly from current projections.
The analysis of economic conditions presented at
the May 27 meeting indicated a further slight moder-
ation in economic activity. However, little evidence
of any abatement in inflationary pressures was pre-
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sented; and prices were projected to continue rising
at a rapid pace. Financial markets were expected to
come under heavy pressures in June as a result of
the near record volume of corporate income tax
payments due at mid-June. -
Despite these indications of some slowing in eco-
nomic activity and possible pressures in financial
markets in June, the FOMC decided that in view of
the persistence of strong inflationary pressures and
expectations, a relaxation of the existing degree of
monetary restraint would not be appropriate at this
time. Special note was made that in recent months
banks had increasingly drawn on nondeposit sources
of funds other than Eurodollars, and these sources of
funds were not reflected in the bank credit proxy as
currently calculated.5 Some members, taking this fac-
tor into account, argued that the change in the ad-
justed bank credit proxy be kept in the lower end of
its projected range of zero to 5 per cent from May to
June.
The Directive and Money Market Conditions —
Judging the influence of open market operations in
terms of money market indicators — the Federal funds
rate and free reserves — the net effect of open market
operations resulted in progressively tighter money
market conditions through the end of May. Although
the directive issued at each meeting expressed an
intent on the part of the Committee to “maintain
prevailing finn conditions in the money and short-
term credit markets,” the Federal funds rate and net
borrowed reserves increased between each meeting in
the first five months of 1969. During part
of this period the decision to permit tighter
money market conditions was influenced by
moderately lo~verTreasury bill yields. For
example, at the May 27 meeting it was
reported that since the previous meeting the
System had not fully offset reserve drains, in
light of the tendency for bill yields to move
below the lower end of their recent ranges.
Table I presents averages of the Federal
funds rate and net borrowed reserves be-
tween each FOMC meeting. The average
level of the Federal funds rate rose from 6.21
per cent in the three weeks ending January
11, to an average of 6.80 per cent between
the March 4 and April 1 meeting, then in-
5
For example nondeposit funds were obtained by
sales of commercial paper by bank holding com-
panies and sales of loan participations to nonbank
customers under agreements to repurchase.
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creased steadily to an average of 8.31 per cent by
the May 27 FOMC meeting. Average net borrowed
reserves rose from $402 million at the beginning of
the year to $725 million prior to the April 1 meeting,
and then to an average of $1,116 million prior to the
May 27 FOMC meeting.
The rise in the level of net borrowed reserves from
the end of December 1968 to the end of May 1969
reflected primarily a sharp increase in the level of
member bank borrowings from the Federal Reserve
Banks. The average level of member bank borrowings
rose from $841 million in the four weeks ending
January iS, to $1,359 million in the four weeks end-
ing May 28, 1969. According to one view the rising
level of member bank borrowings reflected primarily
the response of the banks to the increasing spread
between the discount rate and yields on short-term
business loans.
The cost to member banks of borrowing from Fed-
eral Reserve Banks remained fixed at 5.5 per cent
until April 4. The average yield on short-term busi-
ness loans by commercial banks rose from 6.61 per
cent in November 1968 to 7.32 per cent in February
1969. In early April the discount rate was raised to
6 per cent. However, yields on short-term business
loans rose to 7.86 in May 1969, and beginning in late
May, Treasury bill yields began to rise to higher
levels. A further indication of the rising yields avail-
able to banks on short-term business loans was the
prime rate, which banks raised from 6% per cent in
December 1968 to 7½per cent on March 17 and then
to 8½ per cent on June 9.
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lobe II
ADJUSTED BANK CREDIT PROXY1
JANUARY TO MAY, 1969
Annual raIn of change)
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Proviso Clause — An analysis of open-market opera-
tions must also include a consideration of the proviso
clause. Under the proviso clause, the Desk during the
first half of 1969 was to alter its operations if:
-. -bank credit appears to be deviating significantly
from current projections.
Table II presents the range projected for the adjusted
bank credit proxy at each of the first six FOMC
meetings in 1969, and also the actual change in the
adjusted bank credit proxy for these periods. These
data are taken from the “Records of Policy Actions”
published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin and the
Annual Report. For example, at the March 4 meeting
the current projection was that the adjusted credit
proxy would decline at an annual rate of 3 to 6 per
cent from February to March. The actual decline of
the adjusted credit proxy from February to March
was later reported to be at a 6.5 per cent annual rate.
Examining Table II, the actual rate of change of
the adjusted credit proxy was below the range pro-
jected for January, in the middle of the range pro-
jected for February, and below the range projected
for March. Deviations of the bank credit proxy during
most of this three-month period appear to have been
in the direction of a greater slowing in bank credit
than had been projected. During this period the Fed-
eral funds rate rose from 6.21 per cent to 6.80 per
cent, and net borrowed reserves rose from $402 million
to $725 million.
One explanation given in the Annual Report of
this increasing tightness in money market conditions
was that the Federal Reserve System was reluctant to
permit any indication of easing in monetary policy.
According to the Desk Manager’s Report on Opera-
lions of the Open Market Account:
during March, the interpretation of the bank
credit proxy in light of proviso clause of the direc-
tive was unusually difficult.
On the surface, the levels projected might have
suggested implementation of the proviso clause on
the side of slightly less restraint. But several factors
argued against such implementation. First there was
considerable market belief that the System would
not persevere in its policy of restraint, so such a
move would have risked being interpreted as a
greater relaxation of monetary restraint than in-
tended — particularly in view of the decline in
Treasury bill rates after early March. Second, there
was growing evidence that banks might be expand-
ing credit irk ways not measured by the proxy. And
finally, the estimates for April pointed to a probable
rise in the proxy, reversing the March decline. In
light of all these circumstances, the proviso clause
was not implemented.°
In April the credit proxy expanded at an estimated
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projected at the April 1 meeting. As reported in the
April 29 Policy Record, “open market operations were
modified in the direction of greater firmness as the
period progressed, when it became increasingly clear
that bank credit was expanding at a pace significantly
in excess of the range projected at the previous
meeting.”
6
Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Annual Report, 1969,
pp. 219-220.
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At the April 29 FOMC meeting, staff projections
suggested a marked reversal in May of the rate of
growth of bank credit, a rate of decline of 2 to 5 per
cent. Open market operations appear to have been
directed to maintaining money market conditions that
would ensure the reversal in the growth rate of the
credit proxy. The credit proxy declined at an annual
rate of 2 per cent, at the upper end of the projected
range, between the meetings at the end of April and
end of May. During the same period the average level
of the Federal funds rate rose to 8.31 per cent and net
borrowed reserves averaged $1,116 million.
According to the Report of the Desk Manager, open
market operations were partly conditioned by:
the tenacity of doubts concerning the resolution
of the System to hold fast to a policy of stem re-
straint. The net result of System operations in the
April-May interval was to make amply clear that
the Federal Reserve was serious about monetary
restraint.7
At the late May meeting the range projected for
the adjusted credit proxy in June was a0to 5 per
cent annual rate of increase. As discussed earlier, due
to the growing use by banks of nondeposit sources
of funds, some members of the FOMC urged that the
growth rate of the adjusted credit proxy be kept
closer to zero than 5 per cent. In June the result of
open..market operations was somewhat firmer money
market conditions. The adjusted credit proxy declined
at a 3 per cent annual rate in June, considerably
below the lower end of its projected range.
Summary — During the first half of 1969 the word-
ing of the published directive remained about the
same at each FOMC meeting. However, the actual
implementation of open market operations resulted
in progressively tighter money market conditions.
When the annual rate of change of the adjusted
credit proxy was in the lower end or below the pro-
jected range, the Desk did not appear to have altered
operations to ease money market conditions. When
the credit proxy increased at a more rapid rate than
projected, as in April, the Desk altered open market
operations toward considerably firmer money market
conditions as measured by the Federal funds rate
and net borrowed reserves, The maintenance of pre-
vailing money and short-term credit market condi-
tions from one FOMC meeting to the next would
have required considerably larger purchases of Coy-
T
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emment securities to keep the Federal funds rate
and net borrowed reserves at a relatively constant
average level.
The open market actions of the Desk, which re-
sulted in progressively tighter money market condi-
tions and a growth rate of the adjusted credit proxy
in the lower end of its projected growth range, appear
to have been in line with the consensus of the mem-
bers of the FOMC. During this period there were only
two dissents by FOMC members commenting on the
progressive tightening of monetary policy as indicated
by money market conditions and monetary aggre-
gates. As discussed earlier, these were the dissent of
Mr. Moths at the January 14 meeting and Governor
Maisel’s statement at the April 1 meeting.
July to December — Increa.secl
Monetary Restraint
The expansionary effects of monetary influences on
the future growth of economic activity were further
markedly reduced in the second half of 1969, as in-
dieated by monetary aggregates and market interest
rates. The money stock showed almost no increase
on average from June to December 1969, compared
to a 4.4 per cent rate of increase from December 1968
to June 1969. Likewise, bank credit on balance did
not increase in the last half of 1969, compared to a
4.8 per cent rate of increase over the first six months.
In the last half of the year market interest rates
continued to increase. The Treasury bill rate had re-
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mained about constant over the first half of the year.
Then, from an average of 6.01 per cent in the period
before the May 27 FOMC meeting the Treasury bill
rate rose to an average to 7.63 per cent prior to the
December 16 meeting.
At the FOMC meetings in late June and mid-July,
the members of the Committee were presented with
GNP forecasts that suggested further slowing in real
output growth in the second half of the year, reaching
a relatively low growth rate in the fourth quarter. Staff
projections indicated continued restraint in Federal
expenditures, a continued decline in residential con-
struction, a moderate rate of consumer spending,
and a marked deceleration in the growth of capital
spending by business after mid-year.
At these two meetings there was further discussion
about the increased use by banks of nondeposit
sources of funds and some consideration of possible
means of limiting banks’ access to this type of funds.
Discussion was also directed to Eurodollar borrow-
ings by banks and outflows of U.S. funds to the Euro-
dollar market along with their effects on the U.S. bal-
ance of payments. Consideration was also given to the
desirability of increasing discount rates and raising
Regulation Q ceiling rates on large-denomination
CD’s.
The consensus of the members of the FOMC was
that, although there were some preliminary signs of
slowing in the rate of growth of real product, infla-
tionary pressures and expectations remained strong
and hence argued against any move to a lesser degree
of monetary restraint. At both of these meetings, some
members of the FOMC expressed a belief that, in
the light of the slow response of prices to current
policy, any doubts arising from the conduct of open
market actions should be resolved in the direction of
further firming of money market conditions. However,
the majority of the membership of the Committee
agreed that open market policy should remain un-
changed. At the June 24 meeting, some members
noted the strains evident in financial markets and the
possibility of unusual liquidity pressures. At the July
15 meeting the members agreed that the forthcoming
Treasury refunding militated against any appreciable
change in open market policy.
At the June 24 meeting Governor Maisel dissented
from the majority view. In his dissent, as summarized
in the Policy Record, Governor Maisel noted that, on
balance, conditions in money and short-term credit
markets were now considerably firmer than at the end
of April, while the monetary aggregates had been
declining:
He was concerned that further tightening to an
nndesirable degree might occur under the directive
favored by the maioritv today, since the language of
the second paragraph was similar to that of the
directives the Committee had issued on April 29
and May 27 ....In his judgment, moderate positive
rates of growth in bank credit were appropriate under
current circumstances, and he thought it would be
desirable for the Committee to act now to bring about
a transition to maintainable financial conditions. Ac-
cordingly, he preferred a directive calling for main-
tenance of the money and short-term credit market
conditions that had prevailed on the average in the
second quarter rather than the tighter conditions
currently prevailing.
On July 24 the Board of Governors amended Regu-
lation Do nmember bank deposits subject to reserve
requirements. This action made certain bank deposit
liabilities arising out of Eurodollar transactions sub-
ject to reserve requirements. At the August 12 FOMC
meeting it was estimated that this action would raise
required reserves of member banks by $450 million in
the statement week ending August 20. This action and
the expectations by banks that the Federal Reserve
Board would soon implement other proposed amend-
ments to Regulation D were expected to reduce banks’
demand for nondeposit funds. Other matters consid-
ered by the Committee included the recent French
devaluation of the franc, and the expectation that the
Treasury would raise about $1.5 to $2 billion of new
cash later in August.
The consensus of the members of the Committee
was that, due to the continued inflationary pressures
in the economy, it was necessary to maintain the
existing degree of monetary restraint However, the
majority agreed that any tendencies toward firmer
money market conditions resulting from recent regu-
latory actions by the Board of Governors or foreign
exchange developments should be resisted by open
market operations.
At this meeting Governor Mitchell joined Governor
Maisel in dissenting from the majority opinion. In
their opinion monetary policy had become more and
more restrictive. To guard against what they viewed
as an undesirable further tightening as reflected in a
further downward trend of the monetary aggregates,
they favored a directive calling for modification of
open market operations if such decline in monetary
aggregates did in fact occur.
Information on economic activity available at the
September and early October meetings provided
some further signs of easing in total demand for
output. Staff projections were for continued slowing
in growth of real output through the second quarter
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of 1970. The available data, however, continued to
indicated pervasive price increases. Also, at the
October 7 meeting it was noted that fiscal policy
was likely to become less restrictive in early 1970.
Based on their view that there were continued per-
sistent inflationary pressures and expectations in the
economy, and the possibility that fiscal policy would
become less restrictive in early 1970, the majority of
the FOMC voted at both meetings that open market
operations should be directed to maintaining the exist-
ing firm conditions in money and short-term credit
markets. At both meetings several members empha-
sized the desirability of avoiding any firming in policy.
Governors Mitchell and Maisel, at the September 9
meeting, again voiced their dissent froni the majority
opinion. They expressed the belief that:
- in measuring the degree of monetary firmness
or restraint the Committee should give more weight
to movements in ,key monetary aggregates — such
as the money stock, private demand deposits, total
and nonborrowed reserves, and hank ciedit — and
in longer-term interest rates. In their judgment, the
fact that the monetary aggregates had been declin-
ing and longer-term interest rates had been rising
in recent weeks indicated that restraint had been
steadily increasing, even though money market con-
ditions had been relatively stable. They favored
maintaining the overall posture 0f restraint measured
in terms of such aggregates and interest rates, and
permitting more flexibility in money market condi-
tions in order to do so.
Governor Maisel also dissented from the majority
decision at the October 7 meeting, noting that:
interest rates on all types of market securities
had risen substantially on balance in the period since
late April, and that during this period the Com-
mittee’s directives — like that favored by the majority
today — had called for maintenance of prevailing
finn conditions in money and short-term credit mar-
kets, He also noted that the behavior of key mone-
tary aggregates, including member bank reserves,
the money stock, and bank credit, had been consid-
erably weaker in the third quarter — either declin-
irig more rapidly or rising more slowly — than in the
first half of theyear; and that sharp declines in the
aggregates were projected for October if prevailing
money market conditions were maintained.
Repeating his views expressed at previous meetings,
Governor Maisel stated his belief that more flexibility
should be permitted in money market conditions, in
order to maintain but not intensify the present degree
of monetary restraint measured in terms of key aggre-
gates and interest rates,
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At the last three FOMC meetings in 1969, evidence
of the restrictive effects of monetary restraint on the
real sector increased. At the October 28 meeting, key
economic indicators still provided a mixed picture of
the direction of economic activity. Industrial produc-
tion declined in September for the second month in
a row, the unemployment rate rose to 4 per cent
from 3.5 per cent in August, retail sales adjusted for
price increases were below a year earlier, and there
was evidence of considerable slowing in the growth of
personal income. On the other hand, new orders of
manufacturers for durable goods showed a widespread
increase in September, and wholesale prices of indus-
trial commodities were increasing more rapidly than
in the second quarter.
By the December 16 FOMC meeting the signs of
slowing in economic activity were much more wide-
spread. Industrial production declined in November
for the fourth straight month. Most measures of labor
market conditions indicated some easing in the de-
mand for labor, and retail sales in real terms con-
tinued at a level below a year earlier. Staff projec-
tions were for a halt in the growth of real GNP in the
fourth quarter and little or no rise in the first half of
1970.
During October short-term and long-term interest
rates had declined sharply. This decline, however,
represented only a short-mn reaction to announce-
ments of possible improvements in peace negotiations
on the Vietnam War and the publication of the 4 per
cent unemployment rate for September. Beginning
in late October the trend of market interest rates was
reversed. Through the remainder of the year both
long-term and short-tenn rates rose rapidly.
There was some discussion by the members of the
Committee at the last meetings in 1969 over the re-
newed rapid rises in interest rates. At the last three
meetings several members expressed the view that
any tendencies toward lower market interest rates
should not be offset by open market operations.
Concern was expressed at the November 25 meet-
ing about the possible impact on financial markets of
the October 29 announcement by the Board of Gov-
ernors that it was considering amendments to Regu-
lation D (reserve requirements) and Regulation Q
which would affect certain types of nondeposit funds
of commercial banks. This concern was expressed in
the proviso clause for the November 25 directive in-
structing the Desk to alter operations:
-. .if pressures arise in connection with possible bank
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The Committee also discussed the possible effects
of these interest rate developments on savings insti-
tutions, which were restricted in the level of intei’est
rates they could pay depositors. The members noted
there were large outflows from savings institutions
following the September dividend period, and the
possibility of a large amount of withdrawals following
the end of the year dividend period \vas taken into
consideration.
The FOMC’s concern with possible liquidity pres-
sures in financial markets was expressed in the pro-
viso clause of the December 16 directive instructing
the Desk to alter operations
- if unusual liquidity pressures should develop.
Despite the mounting evidence of a developing
slowdown in economic activity, the majority of the
Committee decided at each of the last three meetings
in 1969 that it would not be appropriate to relax the
existing degree of monetary restraint. This decision
appears to have been based primarily on the lack of
any evidence of slowing in the increase of prices, and
the view that inflationary expectations still remained
firmly entrenched.
The Directive and Money Market Conditions — In
the last half of 1969, as over the first half, the direc-
tive repeatedly expressed a desire by the majority of
the FOMC to have open market operations conducted
to “maintain the prevailing firm conditions in money
and short-term credit markets.” Table I presents the
Table Ill
ADJUSTED BANK CREDIT PROXY’
JUNE TO DECEMBER, 1969
Annual rates of changel
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average level of net borrowed reserves and the Fed-
eral funds rate. Over the last hail of 1969, using these
measures of money market conditions, the irnplemen-
tation of open market operations by the Desk resulted
in approximately the same prevailing money market
conditions. The Federal funds rate, on average, moved
in approximately an 8.6 to 9.2 per cent range, and
net borrowed reserves averaged in the range of $900
to $1,000 million.
Table III presents the projections for the bank
credit proxy and the actual rates of change of the
credit proxy. During most of this period the credit
proxy was held in the lower end of its projected range.
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Other Measures of Restraint — In the second half
of 1969 open market operations resulted in approxi-
mately the same firmness in money market conditions
from one FOMC meeting to the next. However, other
measures of the degree of restraint being exerted on
the growth of the money stock and bank credit, such
as member bank reserves and the monetary base, in-
dieated considerably increased restraint.
From June to December total reserves declined at
a4per cent annual rate, compared to a 0.7 per cent
rate of increase from December 1968 to June 1969.
The monetary base grew at a 2 per cent rate over the
last six months of 1969, only one-half as rapidly as
during the first half of the year. From June to October
56 D6
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growth of these key aggregates was sharply re-
stricted. During this period the monetary base grew
at only a 0.8 per cent rate and total reserves declined
at a 9.5 per cent annual rate.
Over the first half of 1969 progressively tighter
money market conditions, as measured by the Fed-
eral funds rate and net borrowed reserves, were coin-
cident with decreases in the growth rates of the
monetary base and reserves. In the second half of
the year, relatively constant money market condi-
tions were maintained, but the growth rates of the
monetary base and reserves showed further sharp
declines, The growth rates of money and bank credit
followed the movements of the monetary base and
reserves, declining further in the second half of 1969.
Summary and Conclusions
In 1969 the dominant concern of the FOMC re-
ported in the records of policy actions wa~with
inflationary pressures and inflationary expectations.
The major policy goal of the Committee was to con-
duct open market operations so that the effect of
monetary influences on the economy would be restric-
tive, During 1969 the net effect of monetary influ-
ences on the economy was substantially reduced. A
reading of the directives issued by the FOMC does
not give an adequate picture of the degree of re-
straint apparently desired by the members of the
FOMC. Throughout the year the wording of the ma-
jor clause of the directive was almost unaltered:
System open market operations until the next
meeting of the Committee shall be conducted with
a view to maintaining the prevailing firm conditions
in money and short-term credit markets.
However, this article has pointed out that through
the first half of 1969, money market conditions as
measured by the average levels of the Federal funds
rate and net borrowed reserves became progressively
tighter. This progressive firming in money market
conditions appears to have been what the majority
of the voting membership of the FOMC desired,
In the second half of the year, although the meas-
ures of money market conditions used in this article
remained about constant, other measures of policy
such as the monetary base and member bank reserves
indicated that open market operations were exercis-
ing markedly greater restraint on the growth of money
and bank credit, This distinction was pointed out in
several dissents by Covernors Maisel and Mitchell,
Published records suggest that the majority of the
members of the FOMC were unwilling to move to
an easier open market policy until they could see
visible evidence of a reduction in the rate of price
increases and until they were assured that expecta-
tions of rising prices had been broken. Such evidence
did not materialize in 1969. These conditions tend to
imply that, by voting to maintain existing money
market conditions, the majority of the membership of
the Committee desired monetary policy in the second
half of the year to exercise an even more restrictive
influence on future economic activity than in the first
half of the year.
Because of the lagged effect of changes in the
growth rate of the monetary aggregates on real eco-
nomic activity, the full impact of the sharp reduction
in the growth rates of money and bank credit on real
output and employment did not appear until the
first half of 1970. Whether the restrictive monetary
policy of 1969 will in fact reduce the rate of price
increases and reduce inflationary expectations depends
upon whether the rate of increase of money is held to
a moderate rate during 1970.
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